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Environmental Cooperation in the (Partially)
Disaggregated State: Lessons from the Security and
Prosperity Partnership of North America
Neil Craik* and Joseph DiMento**
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 20 and 21, 2007, Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, US
President George W. Bush, and Mexican President Felipe Calder6n met in
Montebello, Quebec to discuss the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North
America ("SPP"), a trilateral initiative that has as its objective enhanced
regulatory cooperation between the three North American states in order to
improve continental security and regional competitiveness. Despite being
described in prosaic terms by government officials and industry supporters as a
primarily technical exercise, the SPP has attracted trenchant criticism across the
political spectrum. The SPP has been described variously as "integration by
stealth,"' the creation of a North American "European Union with none of the
safeguards on the environment and social rights, ' 2 and (most floridly) as a
"[u]nion that will bury America under more than 100 million, mostly poor
Mexicans, and tens of millions of Canadians, used to their lavish social welfare
benefits and socialized medicine."3 Still others have dismissed the SPP altogether
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Maude Barlow, Where's the Transpareny in the 'Security' and 9rtsperi0,' Partnershbip?, Globe and Mail
(Aug 16, 2007).
2 Chris Cobb, End 'Under the Table' Deal, Critic Says, Ottawa Citizen A4 (Apr 2, 2007) (quoting
Council of Canadians national chairman, Maude Barlow).
3 John tbbitson, Little Chance Partnership Proposal Will Lead to North American Union, Globe and Mail
A9 Ouly 9, 2007) (quoting the News Journal of Mansfield, Ohio).
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as a disappointing "much ado about nothing," noting that it is little more than a
grocery list of bureaucratic minutiae that ignores the pressing trade and social
imperatives affecting the region.' And so opens another front in the fight over
globalization.
From a governance perspective, the SPP appears to adopt on a grand scale
what international legal and international relations scholars have identified as a
trend towards international regulation through informal arrangements negotiated
directly by domestic agencies with their foreign counterparts.' In this regard,
Anne-Marie Slaughter has written extensively about a "new world order" based
on overlapping networks of regulators who seek to coordinate transnational
activity and achieve common goals through direct agency-to-agency
interactions.' In some cases, the form of cooperation is quite minimal, such as
sharing information on best regulatory practices or extending notice of
regulatory activities to regulators in potentially impacted jurisdictions. However,
informal cooperation efforts may evolve into more substantively prescriptive
arrangements, such as regulatory harmonization, mutual recognition
arrangements, and cooperative enforcement mechanisms. What distinguishes
these governance structures from traditional forms of international cooperation
is that network arrangements are not negotiated through central agencies such as
foreign affairs departments, nor do they revolve around a formally binding
treaty. Instead, cooperating regulators directly interact with one another with a
view to developing shared guidelines or "frameworks for cooperation" to
institutionalize their cooperative efforts.' To use Professor Slaughter's phrase,
the state as a relevant international actor is increasingly "disaggregating into its
separate, functionally distinct parts," as opposed to operating as a single,
indivisible unit.8
Cooperation among financial regulators has been the most active area for
transgovernmental networks, with quite evolved regulatory networks in areas
4 See Roland Paris, A TrilateralMishmash, Globe and Mail A17 (Feb 26, 2007).
5 Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton 2004). See also Kal Raustiala, The Architecture
of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 Va J Intl L
1 (2002); Anne-Marie Slaughter and David Zaring, Networking Goes Internationak An Update, 2 Ann
Rev of L & Soc Sci 211 (2006); Christopher A. Whytock, A Rational Design Theory of
Transgovemmentalism: The Case of E.U. -U.S. Merger Review Cooperation, 23 BU Ind L J 1 (2005); Mark
A. Pollack and Gregory C. Shaffer, eds, Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy ch 5-7
(Rowman & Littlefield 2001) (providing case studies on US and European transgovernmental
arrangements).
6 See Slaughter, A New World Order (cited in note 5).
7 Id at 172. See also Rausriala, 43 Va J Intl L at 26-50 (cited in note 5) (providing examples of
regulatory cooperation in securities, competition and, environmental regulation).
8 Anne-Marie Slaughter, The Real New World Order, 76 Foreign Aff 183, 184 (1997).
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such as banking, competition law, insurance, and securities regulation. 9
Environmental regulation is also emerging as an issue area where networks are
being utilized to address transboundary and global environmental issues, as well
as addressing environmental nontariff barriers to trade, although to date the
regulatory achievements of environmental networks are less developed than
those found in the financial area.' ° The SPP marks a further, and in our view,
important, development in the use of transgovernmental networks because
under the SPP, the executive branches of Canada, the United States, and Mexico
deliberately turn to transgovernmental networks as a governance strategy across
multiple issue areas. The SPP, which proposes an ambitious agenda of security,
economic, energy, and environmental initiatives, identifies areas for increased
cooperation and charges a series of working groups that are principally made up
of federal government officials from the three partner countries to negotiate and
to implement cooperative solutions. The self-conscious use of networks as an
alternative to traditional international institutions on a broad scale was
contemplated by Slaughter," but the SPP marks the first practical attempt by
governments to create a cross-cutting transnational governance structure that
relies principally on transgovernmental networks. Consequently, the SPP
provides an important opportunity to consider the prospects and limitations of
transgovernmentalism at large.
The SPP process in both its substance and form has attracted significant
opposition by domestic groups in all three countries. It is viewed by its critics as
proposing a more highly integrated governance structure that erodes national
sovereignty through a process that has privileged corporate interests and lacks
democratic accountability) 2 While it may be tempting to dismiss this criticism as
coming from the margins of the political spectrum," the concerns over
accountability have found much purchase within the legislative branches of the
three North American governments, which have been excluded from the SPP
9 Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through Government Networks, in Michael Byers,
ed, The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International Relations and International Law 177,
179 (Oxford 2000). See also Kalypso Nicolaidis and Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual
Recognition Regimes: Governance without Global Government, 68 L & Contemp Probs 263 (2005).
10 Raustiala, 43 Va J Ind L at 49 (cited in note 5).
11 Slaughter, New World Order at 244 (cited in note 5) ("Here... we turn to what could be if
government networks were, alongside traditional international organizations, widely recognized
and self-consciously constituted mechanism of global governance.").
12 Barlow, Where's the Transparengy, Globe and Mail (cited in note 1).
13 For example, much of the criticism in the United States arises from commentators on the far right
of the political spectrum, while in Canada the criticism tends to come from the left.
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process. 14 The response to this criticism by government officials and the SPP
supporters is to deny the SPP's governmental ambitions. Instead, government
officials maintain that networks are mostly about exchanging ideas and
information, and where rules do emerge they are largely technical and subject to
domestic accountability measures.is The picture that is emerging from the debate
over the SPP is one of profound incommensurability, with respective
understandings of the role and functions of the SPP being so divergent as to
render any debate practically meaningless.'
6
In relation to environmental and resource issues, the SPP has raised
concerns about the potential for the adoption of less preventive standards and
the loss of control over national resource policy. These concerns have been
exacerbated by the absence of any fixed avenues for input and consultation by
nongovernmental groups and the absence of any substantive commitment to
environmental values within the SPP structure. The result has been a lack of
understanding and growing mistrust of the SPP's government and private sector
supporters in relation to the SPP's impact on the environment.17
The purpose of this Article is to evaluate the SPP process critically and the
opposition to it in light of the existing literature on transgovernmental networks.
14 The SPP has been raised as a campaign issue in both the Republican and Democratic presidential
races in the United States. It has been the subject of an amendment to a transportation bill in the
US Congress, "prohibiting the use of funds to participate in a working group pursuant to the
Security and Prosperity Partnership." See CBC News, SPP FAQs, (Aug 20, 2007), available online
at <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/spp/> (visited Nov 17, 2007). See also H Con Res
40, 110th Cong, 1st Sess (Jan 22, 2007), available online at <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=110-cong-bills&docid=f:hc40ih.txt.pdf > (visited Nov 17, 2007) (noting
the SPP acts to "circumvent United States trade, transportation, homeland security, and border
security... makes the United States-Mexico border less secure because Mexico is the primary
source country of illegal immigrants into the United States," and can "violate and threaten United
States sovereignty").
15 See Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, SPP Myths vs Facts, available online at
<http://www.spp.gnv/myths-vsfacts.asp> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (describing SPP as a
"dialogue" and noting requirements to conform with domestic administrative requirements)
("SPP Myths vs Facts").
16 This divergence was exemplified in an exchange between Gordon Laxer, a political economist and
resource expert, and Leon Benoit, the Conservative Chair of the Canadian House of Commons
International Trade Committee. Laxer sought to raise concerns regarding the SPP discussions on
energy security in the absence of any clear Canadian national energy policy, but was prevented
from doing so on the basis that his comments were not relevant. In essence, while Laxer felt that
energy policy was central to his concerns over the SPP, the Chair was not prepared to consider
the link as directly bearing on the matter before the Committee. Evidence of Gordon Laxer, Standing
Committee on International Trade, 39th Can Parl, 1st Sess 1210, 1210-1215 (May 10, 2007),
available online at <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/CommitteePublication.aspx?Sourceld=208182
&Lang=1&PARLSES=391&JNT=0&COM=0> (visited Nov 17,2007).
17 See, for example, Linda McQuaig, Is Water on the Table at Montebello, Toronto Star AA08 (Aug 21,
2007) (describing undisclosed plan to divert Canadian water to the United States).
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This is accomplished with specific reference to those aspects of the SPP that
address environmental and resource issues. More particularly, Section II of the
Article contends that characterizing the SPP as a form of transgovernmentalism
adds considerable analytic clarity to the debate over the SPP. Our basic
argument is that the paucity of the debate results from the failure of the
architects of the SPP and their critics to appreciate the nature of
transgovernmental networks as a governance structure. To this end we identify
certain structural features shared by transgovernmental networks and examine
the competing claims concerning the SPP in light of these characteristics.
Section III of the Article provides additional support for the descriptive
claims of transgovernmentalists that states are turning to networks. The
development and structure of the SPP, however, qualifies the central
transgovernmentalist claim that the state is disaggregating. Instead, the picture
that emerges is one of partial disaggregation where central governments retain
the power to create networks, to enable them, and to define their agendas. This
Article argues that this is a state of affairs with mixed normative implications.
The situation also puts the debate on the SPP, described in Section IV, in greater
focus by allowing for exploration into whose characterization of the SPP more
closely resembles its actual governance features. The result, we suggest, is that
the debate is in its essence one between networks as they are and networks as
they could be.
Finally, Section V argues that the nature of transnational networks requires
a distinct form of legitimacy. In the SPP process, the framers rely exclusively on
two forms of legitimacy: expert legitimacy, whereby the authority exercised by
networks is justified on the basis of the qualifications of its members to solve
technical problems, and a highly formalized version of process legitimacy, which
tends to equate legitimacy with legality. In light of the discussion in the Section
II of the Article, we argue that these forms of legitimacy are insufficient on their
own. Here we compare the underlying normative structure of the SPP's
environmental and resource network initiatives with the structure of other
international environmental and resource institutions that express a shared
normative commitment to substantive environmental ends. Our conclusion, like
that of Professor Slaughter, is that the turn to networks as a governance strategy
requires a shared normative foundation. But whereas Slaughter appears content
to rely on principles of procedural legitimacy, such as inclusivity, discursiveness,
and subsidiarity,"8 this Article maintains that a shared commitment to substantive
environmental principles is also required. This conclusion does not necessarily
negate the possibility of an effective transgovernmental world order, but it
suggests that we should approach such claims with caution.
18 Slaughter, A New World Order at 244-57 (cited in note 5).
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II. THE NATURE OF NETWORKS
The emergence of the disaggregated state is primarily understood as a
reaction to systemic conditions in world politics, such as vastly increased
interdependence, technological innovation, and increased regulatory density. 9 As
the capacity of the nation-state to solve politically salient issues weakens due to a
growing incongruence between global, economic, and national political arenas
and the accelerated need for responsive regulatory action, °  increased
opportunities for the shifting of authority both vertically and horizontally have
emerged. But despite the predictions of the waning influence of the state in
world politics, the state has retained its prominence-although not its monopoly
(such as it was)-on the exercise of authority beyond the state.2' The result is a
"more decentralized, multi-centric system" that coexists alongside the traditional
state-centered system.
22
Viewed in this context, the disaggregation of the state is presented as being
demand driven. As regulated entities expand their activities and impacts beyond
national borders, regulators seek to follow. While one possibility is for regulators
to extend their regulatory powers beyond the state unilaterally, legal constraints
and political resistance to extraterritoriality by other states make cooperative
forms of regulation an attractive option.23 Cooperation at the state-to-state level
is another alternative, but requires take up by central governments, whose
foreign affairs agendas are already crowded. 24 As an alternative means by which
to pursue their regulatory goals, regulators have turned to their foreign
counterparts to share information and to develop common and compatible
regulatory approaches. Networks of administrative officials facilitate
19 See generally Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence: Politics in a World in
Transition Lttle, Brown 1977). See also Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, Power and Interdependence
Revisited, 41 Intl Org 725 (1987).
20 Consider Thomas Risse, Transnational Governance and Legiimagy, paper presented to the Fifth Pan-
European International Relations Conference (Sept 9-12, 2004), in Standing Group on International
Relations 3-4, available online at <http://www.sgir.org/conference2004/papers/Risse%20-
%20Transnational%20Governance%20and%20Legitimacy.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
21 See Slaughter, 76 Foreign Aff (cited in note 8) (responding, in part, to Jessica Mathews, Power
Shift, 76 Foreign Aff 50 (1997)).
22 James Rosenau, Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuiy 11 (Princeton 1990).
23 In the environmental context, see Neil Craik, Transboundagy Pollution, Unilateralism, and the Limits of
Extratermtorzal Juisdicion: The Second Trail Smelter Dispute, in Rebecca Bratspies and Russell Miller,
eds, Transboundagy Harm in International Law: Lessons from the Trail Smelter Arbitration 109 (Cambridge
2006) (discussing difficulties of extraterritorial application of environmental legislation); Shi-Ling
Hsu and Austen Parrish, Litigating Canada-U.S. Transboundagy Harm: International Environmental
Lawmaking and the Threat ofExtraterritorial Reciprocity, 48 Va J Intl L 1 (2007).
24 See Slaughter, Governing through Government Networks at 189-91 (cited in note 9).
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communication, allowing officials to better understand their shared problems
and how they might benefit from cooperation and to provide forums for the
development of cooperative solutions.25
Transgovernmental networks have not been defined and delineated in any
precise way, and the definitions that do exist tend to be catholic in their
approach, allowing for a large variation of arrangements to fall into the
category.26 What draws transgovernmental networks together as a distinct
governance approach is the absence or minimization of the defining features of
formal international organizations, namely: (1) membership composed of states
or other international organizations; (2) establishment by treaty; (3) autonomy
stemming from its membership and a distinct legal personality; and (4) the ability
to adopt norms addressed to its membership. 7
Transgovernmental networks are not networks of states, but rather
networks of governmental officials. The range of government actors involved in
networks varies considerably, with some networks being constituted of highly
visible government officials with strong democratic credentials, such as
ministers,28 although most networks are constituted of bureaucratic actors.
These latter network participants may be directly part of the civil service or may
be affiliated with agencies that have a measure of autonomy from the
government, such as central banks or independent administrative agencies.29 In
the case of federal states, network participants may also include substate
regulators. For example, the Canada-US Air Quality Committee is a body made
up of agency officials from both the federal regulators and from state and
provincial environmental agencies that share responsibility for regulating air
25 For example, the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation ("NACEC")
plays this role in relation to environmental issues. NACEC has identified issue areas where the
members would benefit from cooperation; it undertakes studies and provides a forum for both
government and citizen input into its initiatives. See note 36.
26 For example, Slaughter provides the following definition: "[A] network is a pattern of regular and
purposive relations among like government units working across the borders that divide countries
from one another and that demarcate the 'domestic' from the 'international' sphere." Slaughter, A
New World Order at 14 (cited in note 5).
27 Philippe Sands and Pierre Klein, Bowett's Law of International Institutions 16 (Sweet & Maxwell 2001).
See also Jose Alvarez, Internalional Organizations as Law-Makers 4 (Oxford 2005).
28 Prominent examples of high-level networks are meetings of the Finance Ministers of the G8
Group of Nations or the G20 Group of Nations. See Slaughter, A New World Order at 37 (cited in
note 5).
29 Examples of networks of independent administrative agencies include the International
Organization of Securities Commissioners and the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision,
while the International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement is principally
made up of environmental officials who are employed directly within the government. See
generally Raustiala, 43 VaJ Ind L (cited in note 5).
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pollution.3" Here, the flexibility of transgovernmentalism accounts for multilevel
governance by providing an opportunity for transgovernmental cooperation
between levels of government that have no formal recognition in international
law. A key defining feature of transgovernmental networks is that network
participants must be able to exercise authority within their own jurisdiction.31
Consequently, network members are able to implement network decisions in
domestic legal orders with relative ease. Networks, unlike many international
organizations, can control entry into the network. This form of exclusivity has
led to some networks being described as "club-like," in that membership may
exclude not only representatives from other states, but may also exclude
government officials from other ministries and agencies within the network
member's state that might have conflicting objectives.32 Networks can thus
optimize the prospects of cooperation by excluding dissenting voices within and
outside domestic polities.
Networks tend not to be constituted formally around a binding treaty, but
rather are established by informal arrangements.33  Consequently,
transgovernmental networks are less likely to have permanent institutional
structures, such as a secretariat or permanent headquarters. 34 Unlike the majority
of financial networks, some environmental networks may be established by
treaty, as in the case of the Canada-US Air Quality Committee.3' Here the treaty
provision defines the Air Quality Committee's mandate, which is to assist in the
implementation of the treaty in the broadest terms, but confers no formal
regulatory authority on it and leaves membership in the committee up to the
30 The Committee was created under the Agreement between the United States and Canada on Air
Quality (1991), art VIII, 30 ILM 676, 682 (1991) ("Canada-US Air Quality Agreement").
31 However, some networks include private entities, such as private stock exchanges in the
International Organization of Securities Commissioners and environmental NGOs in the
International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement. See Slaughter, Governing
through Government Networks at 184-185 (cited in note 9).
32 Slaughter, The New World Order at 200-03 (cited in note 5). See also Robert Keohane and Joseph
Nye, The Club Model of Mulilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimay, in Roger Porter,
et al, eds, Efficieny, Equioy, and Legiimagy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium 264, 266-
67 (Brookings Institution, 2001).
33 See David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial
Regulatoy OtganiZations, 33 Texas Intl LJ 281, 301-02 (1998).
34 There are some exceptions to this; for example, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision
uses the Bank for International Settlement to perform secretariat functions. See Slaughter,
Governing through Government Networks at 182 (cited in note 9).
35 Created under the Canada-US Air Quality Agreement, art VIII (cited in note 30). Slaughter refers
to networks that exist within the framework of a treaty as "nested networks." See Slaughter,
Governing through Government Networks at 200 (cited in note 9) (citing the North American Working
Group on Enforcement and Compliance Cooperation created under the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation (1993), 32 ILM 1480, 1485 (1993) as a further example).
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parties. Functionally, the result is similar, leaving the network participants with
discretion to define the scope of their cooperative efforts. The difference with
networks created within a treaty framework is that the treaty structure more
clearly defines the regulatory goals to which the committee is oriented. Similarly,
the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation ("NACEC"),
a transgovernmental institution made up of the environmental ministers from
each NAFTA country, was created under the North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation and was given a broad implementation mandate.36
The structure of that agreement also imbues the NACEC with a clear mandate
to improve environmental quality.37
The creation of a network does not involve the delegation of authority to
the network. Unlike international organizations or their subsidiary bodies, which
may be granted authority to make future decisions binding on the membership,38
networks affect member behavior through voluntary means, such as the
adoption of guidelines or recommendations.39 In many cases, the network may
simply function as a forum for information sharing. This is often the case with
environmental networks. For example, the Strategic Implementation Plan of the
International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement
("INECE") outlines goals relating to capacity building, raising awareness, and
the development of evaluative tools, but does not seek to develop and to
promote the adoption of specific environmental standards.4"
It would be a mistake, however, to dismiss networks as simply being talk
shops.4 In a number of cases, networks have produced substantial sets of rules
36 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, art 9 (cited in note 35). For an in-depth
review of the role of the NACEC in North American environmental governance, see generally
David Markell and John Knox, eds, Greening NAFTA: The North American Commission for
Environmental Cooperation (Stanford 2003).
37 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, art I (cited in note 35).
38 See Robin R. Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral
Environmental Agreements: A I ttle-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law, 94 Am J Ind L 623, 626
(2000).
39 See id at 655-56. See also Jutta Brunne, COPing with Consent: Law-Making under Multilateral
EnvironmentalAgreements, 15 Leiden J Ind L 1 (2002).
40 International Network for Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, Strategic Implementation
Plan, (Nov 2006), available online at <http://www.inece.org/INECESIP_2006.pdf > (visited
Nov 17, 2007).
41 But see Kenneth Anderson's comment:
Far more common throughout the book than accounts of the successes of
horizontal coordinating networks in the real world are descriptions of
bureaucratic outputs. Networks held meetings, wrote papers, made
recommendations, and drafted statements. To be sure, this is what networks
must do in order to create successful outcomes in which network members go
back to their own operations and implement now-coordinated policies. Yet
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that have been adopted by network members. Prominent among these are the
capital adequacy requirements developed by the Basle Committee and a large
number of Memoranda of Understanding ("MOUs") regarding securities
regulation enforcement negotiated between participants in the International
Organization of Securities Commissioners.42 While these documents are formally
nonbinding, they are written in reasonably precise language and carry with them
expectations of compliance. 43 Another common form of network cooperation is
the use of mutual recognition agreements, which are often administered by
networks but created by central governments. These arrangements provide for
the acceptance and substitutability of another jurisdiction's regulatory processes
and standards in relation to imported products and services, again providing a
hard edge to the work of transgovernmental networks." The progress reports of
the Canada-US Air Quality Committee also reveal a multifaceted work agenda,
which includes coordination of consultation and notification requirements for
projects with transboundary air pollution implications, the coordination of
significant bilateral research and technical programs, as well as comprehensive
assessments of the Air Quality Agreement itself. 41
From this brief description of networks, we can distill a number of
important structural features that transgovernmental networks share. Firstly,
they are governmental, not only because they are made up of government actors,
but because they have as their purpose the creation of prescriptive norms to
unfortunately this is also precisely the procedure followed when networks
create unsuccessful outcomes.
Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereigny and Global Governance Through Global
Government Networks: Book Review ofAnne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order, 118 Harv L Rev 1255,
1277-78 (2005) (emphasis added).
42 See Slaughter, Governing through Government Networks at 183-85 (cited in note 9). See also Raustiala,
43 Va J Ind L at 22-23 (cited in note 5); International Organization of Securities Commissions,
Multilateral Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Consultation and Cooperation and the Exchange of
Information, (May 2002), available online at <http://www.iosco.org/library/index.cfm?section=
pubdocs&year=2002&publicDoclD=l26> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
43 For discussion of characteristics of legalized international arrangements, see Kenneth Abbott, et
al, The Concept ofLegalization, in Goldstein, et al, eds, Legaizaion and World Politics 17 (MIT 2001).
44 Discussed comprehensively in Nicolaidis and Shaffer, 68 L & Contemp Probs at 272 (cited in
note 9).
45 For progress reports, see Canada-US Air Quali y Agreement Progress Reports, available online at
<http://www.ec.gc.ca/cleanair-airpur/Polution-Issues/Transboundary-Air/Canada---United-
StatesAirQualityAgreement-WS83930AC3-0_En.htm> (visited Nov 17, 2007). Notification
of regulated activities is also a feature of antitrust networks, as discussed in Whytock, 23 BU Intl
LJ at 39 (cited in note 5).
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govern social activities.46 The governmental nature of networks may be
overlooked because of their informal nature. Because networks are rarely the
recipients of delegated authority, the commitments they generate tend to be
reflexive and self-regulatory. Even where networks appear to be acting simply as
clearinghouses for best practices and technical information, they are able to
influence policy choices made by regulators.
As Slaughter points out, one of the most important roles that networks will
play is sifting through large volumes of information, determining which
information is most salient and most credible for network members, and
disseminating that information among members.47 It follows from this that
access to networks will be a determinant of whether a group can successfully
wield influence. Slaughter points out that in a highly complex world, where
various interest groups are competing for influence with policymakers, the ability
to privilege certain forms or sources of information is an important source of
power. She continues:
Regulation of information is government by soft power. By changing the
information available to others, you convince them that they want what you
want-the very definition of soft power... The core role of the state thus
shifts from enforcer to provider and guarantor of the quality of the available
information.48
The exercise of authority through soft power is no less governmental.
Indeed, at the international level, states themselves often view softer forms of
regulation as preferable over hard commitments.
49
This points to a further characteristic of transgovernmental networks.
Transgovernmental networks are international in that they seek to govern
activities and relationships beyond the state. As an international form of
governance, the power of networks resides outside the state and, as such,
networks cannot simply rely on the domestic delegation of authority to network
members as a justification of network authority as a whole. This is so because as
participants in an international institution, network members owe their allegiance
46 Consider Commission on Global Governance, Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the
Commission on Global Governance 5 (Oxford 1995) (defining "governance" as "the sum of the many
ways individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs.").
47 Slaughter, A New World Order at 177-78 (cited in note 5). For an important analysis of the
relationship between information that is salient and credible and the ability of that information to
influence outcomes in international environmental policy processes, see Ronald Mitchell, William
Clark, and David Cash, Information and Influence, in Ronald Mitchell, et al, eds, Global Environmental
Assessments: Information and Influence 307 (MIT 2006).
48 Slaughter, A New World Order at 187 (cited in note 5).
49 For discussion of basis of why states may prefer "soft" legalization, see Kenneth Abbott and
Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, in Goldstein, et al, eds, Legafizaion 37
(cited in note 43).
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to, or are accountable to, those individuals and groups that are affected by their
activities, which will include their domestic constituents, but also includes
constituents outside of their own polity."0 For example, in international
organizations such as the World Bank, member representatives are directly
accountable to the government that appoints them, but the institution as a whole
must be accountable to those persons affected by Bank policies. Consequently,
the Bank provides outlets for participation and review of Bank decisions, such as
the Inspection Panel process, whereby groups or individuals who are aggrieved
by a failure of the Bank to follow its procedures may seek an independent review
of the decision taken."1 Transgovernmental networks, which are understood as
an alternative to international organizations, similarly recognize the same
accountability commitments. Thus, we are beginning to see the development of
forms of network accountability that provide opportunities for affected or
merely interested persons to participate in, or comment on, network activities, in
addition to direct principal-agent forms of accountability flowing from network
members to their domestic political masters.52
Transgovernmental networks are also evolulionagy and directive in the sense
that they are oriented towards convergence. 3 In many cases, convergence is the
express policy objective of the network. For example, most of the major
international economic networks seek to develop common sets of rules or
approaches on matters such as bank capitalization requirements, antitrust policy,
and securities regulation.54 Here the purpose of networks is to provide an
alternative to destructive regulatory competition arising from trade pressures
through the creation of common standards and compatible regulatory
approaches.55 Kal Raustiala points out that in many instances convergence is the
50 Slaughter, A New World Order at 233 (cited in note 5) (noting "In a pure disaggregated view, one
set of government officials operates at both the national and the global-regional levels,
performing a set of interrelated functions, but these officials would have to represent both
national and global interests...."). See also Ruth W. Grant and Robert 0. Keohane, Accountabiliy
and Abuses of Power in World Politics, 99 Am Pol Sci Rev 29, 29-30 (2005) (drawing a distinction
between "participation" and "delegation" models of accountability).
51 See International Bank for Reconstruction and Development-International Development Panel,
The World Bank Inspection Panel (Sept 22, 1993), Res No IBRD 93-10 and Res No IDA 93-6 (1999),
available online at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTINSPECTIONPANEL/
Resources/ResolutionMarch2005.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
52 See, for example, David Zaring, Informal Procedure, Hard and Soft, in InternationalAdministraion, 5 Chi
J Intl L 547 (2005). But see Anderson, 118 Harv L Rev at 1285 (cited in note 41) (questioning as a
normative matter whether this independence is desirable).
53 This argument is most forcefully made by Raustiala, 43 VaJ Intl L at 51-70 (cited in note 5).
54 See, for example, Zaring, 5 Chi J Intl L at 572 (cited in note 52) (referring to financial regulatory
networks as "proselytizers," seeking to "spread [the] best practices to fellow regulators').
55 Slaughter and Zaring, Networking Goes International at 217 (cited in note 5).
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result of a very deliberate policy of regulatory exportation by powerful
countries.5 6 For example, the United States Environmental Protection Agency
and the Danish Environmental Protection Agency have adopted strategies that
promote the adoption of their own regulatory solutions as a way to enhance and
to improve the efficacy of other regulators, but also to create a demand for
domestically created environmental technologies.57 Regulatory convergence is
not restricted to harmonization of substantive standards, but also includes the
development of common monitoring and testing methodologies. Much of the
NACEC's work regarding pollutant release and transfer registries has been
directed at the creation of a compatible system of pollutant release tracking
throughout North America. 8 Here, procedural policy convergence that resulted
in accurate comparative assessments of environmental performance led to
substantive policy convergence as jurisdictions identified as laggards faced public
pressure to meet higher environmental standards.5 9
Regulatory convergence through networks also arises through less direct
means. For example, capacity building may push new regulators to adopt an
existing regulatory approach since exporting regulators will be most likely to put
forward their own regulatory solutions. From a cost standpoint, adoption of an
existing framework may be preferable to creating one anew. Additionally,
because network members often share common professional training and seek
solutions to common problems, socialization of network members around a
commonly held framework of norms is a principal source of network efficacy.6°
Socialization does not mean that network members will abandon self-interest,
but insofar as it facilitates reasoned and deliberative interactions between
members, cooperative solutions are more likely to emerge, and dominant
network norms are more likely to be accepted.61 Moreover, because networks
institutionalize repeated interactions among the same group, reputations become
increasingly important, making recalcitrance a less desirable long-term strategy.62
56 See Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl L at 46 (cited in note 5).
57 Id at 44-48 (citing EPA Strategy for Export Promotion, EPA /300 F-93-001).
58 See generally Mark Winfield, North American Pollutant Release and Transfer Registries: A Case Study In
Entironmental Poliy Convegence, in Markell and Knox, eds, Greening NAFTA 38 (cited in note 36).
59 Id at 51.
60 See Slaughter, A New World Order at 198-200 (cited in note 5). Socialization is also cited as a
source of regulatory convergence in Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl L at 52 (cited in note 5).
61 In this regard, there is an acknowledged connection between transgovemmentalism and the
nature of epistemic communities, as described in Peter Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and
International Polig Coordination, 46 Intl Org 1 (1992), discussed in Slaughter, A New World Order at
42 (cited in note 5).
62 Slaughter, A New World Order at 199 (cited in note 5).
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There is nothing inevitable about regulatory convergence; as both Slaughter
and Raustiala point out, networks are not a sufficient condition to produce
convergence.63 Slaughter, for example, argues that in some instances "informed
divergence" may be a preferred outcome:
It is equally possible to imagine legislators or regulators being made aware
of the divergence between their laws or rules and those of a substantial
number of other countries and nevertheless concluding to prize and
preserve their differences on historical, cultural, political, economic, social,
religious, or any other distinctive national grounds. What is critical is that
the same forces pushing toward convergence-the forces of regulatory
export, technical assistance, distilled information and soft law-can also
result in informed divergence. 64
While convergence may not always occur, there appear to be few examples
of networks that do not seek at least to explore the benefits of greater
integration. As the above quotation suggests, the value of convergence may
depend on whose views are accounted for in the process. Where networks are
narrowly drawn, the social and historical reasons for divergence are less likely to
be aired. Thus, while most of the reasons that would propel states to favor
convergence, such as reducing nontariff trade barriers and facilitating more
efficient transnational regulation, exist independently of networks, the structure
of networks is intended to facilitate and to deepen cooperation between
agencies.
As a consequence, networks are non-neutral on debates regarding the value
of integration-they favor it. The effect of adopting a transgovernmental
approach to cooperation is to shift the goal posts by making the starting point of
network discussions the extent of integration, not whether integration is
desirable. To be clear, we do not oppose this shift as a normative matter, but, as
elaborated below, we are of the view that the predisposition of networks
towards integration is likely to affect the legitimacy of transgovernmental
approaches to governance.
III. THE SPP AND PARTIAL DISAGGREGATION
The SPP process fits squarely within the transgovernmental framework,
although the SPP is not a network itself, at least not as traditionally conceived.
Initiated at a meeting of the three North American heads of state held in Waco,
63 Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl L at 52 and 56-7 (cited in note 5); Slaughter, A New World Order at 181-3
(cited in note 5).
64 Slaughter, A New World Order at 182-183 (cited in note 5) (emphasis in original).
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Texas in March 2005,65 the SPP is an agenda of bilateral and trilateral regulatory
cooperation initiatives that are centered on the twin themes of regional security
and regional prosperity, referred to as the Security Agenda and Prosperity
Agenda, respectively. 66 What unites these various initiatives, which are wide-
ranging in their subject matter and in the form of cooperation that they
contemplate, is their use of transgovernmental networks as the vehicle for
cooperation.
The SPP initiatives are grouped along sectoral lines with corresponding
working groups being created under the SPP process.67 The working groups are
made up of governmental officials from the three North American countries.
The working groups themselves may divide their initiatives among smaller
expert groups, which may include participation from nongovernmental groups,
such as industry groups.68 The SPP also created the North American
Competitiveness Council ("NACC"), a group of thirty private-sector executives,
whose mandate is to advise the leaders and ministers on priorities and on
strategic approaches to increase regional competitiveness. 69 The momentum of
the SPP initiatives is maintained by the identification of deadlines for outcomes
and periodic reports to the leaders on SPP accomplishments. There has been an
annual leaders' conference in each of the three years the SPP has been in
existence, which has been used to announce initiatives and to refine the
priorities of the SPP further.
The impetus for the SPP can be attributed to several overlapping sources.
Historically, the SPP, or at least the Prosperity Agenda, can be understood as a
continuation of the economic integration process initiated under the Canada-
United States Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA. While these agreements have
65 Joint Statement of President Bush, President Calder6n, and Prime Minister Martin (Mar 23, 2005),
available online at <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/03/20050323-2.html>
(visited Nov 17, 2007) ("Joint Statement (Mar 23, 2005)").
66 The SPP initiatives are contained in two documents. See White House Office of the Press
Secretary, Properiy Agenda, (Mar 23, 2005), available online at <http://www.spp.gov/
prosperity-agenda/> (visited Nov 17, 2007); White House Office of Press Secretary, Securiy
Agenda, (Mar 23, 2005), available online <http://www.spp.gov/securityL.agenda/> (visited Nov
17, 2007).
67 The working groups were established by the leaders following the 2005 launch of the SPP. See
Joint Statement (Mar 23, 2005) (cited in note 65). A list of the SPP Prosperity Working Groups is
available online at <http://www.spp.gov/prosperity..working/index.asp?dName=prosperity
_working> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
68 For example, this appears to be prevalent in the Energy Working Group.
69 The North American Competitiveness Council was established in the White House Office of the
Press Secretary, The Secutiy and Prosperioy Partnership of North America: Progress, (Mar 31, 2006),
available online at <http://www.spp.gov/pdf/security-and-prosperity-partnership-of north_
america.statement.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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largely eliminated tariff barriers to North American trade, there remain a number
of trade-related issues, such as complicated rules of origin requirements,
regulatory divergence, and ineffective trade dispute settlement mechanisms that
reduce trade efficiencies within North America. ° The current situation was
described by the Canadian International Trade Minister as "the tyranny of small
differences."" The related concern driving the Prosperity Agenda is the widely
felt recognition that North America was losing competitive ground to major
emerging markets, such as China and India, necessitating a renewed focus on
global competitiveness. 2 Consequently, much of the SPP's Prosperity Agenda is
concerned with improved "regulatory cooperation," which includes the
harmonization of standards, mutual recognition, and equivalency measures.
Within the Prosperity Agenda specific attention is given to a number of key
sectors including steel, automotive, food and agriculture, and energy, as well as
to cross-sectoral regulatory areas such as health and the environment.
7 3
The more seismic event that shaped the SPP was the increased emphasis
on domestic security in the United States that followed the 2001 terrorist attacks
in that country. This event underscored the need for enhanced border security in
North America and highlighted the dramatic impact that tighter United States
security measures would have on the movement of people and goods across
North American borders, with consequential impacts on the economies of all
three North American states.74 The immediate response was the negotiation of
bilateral border security arrangements, which themselves adopted a
transgovernmental governance approach."5 The security cooperation measures,
which include border document requirements, immigration security measures,
70 Council on Foreign Relations, Building a North American Communio 158 (Council on Foreign
Relations 2005).
71 Carl Ek, et al, Canada-U.S. Relations, Congressional Research Service Rept No 96-397 at 32 (May
15, 2007), available online at <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/96-397.pdf > (visited Nov 17,
2007).
72 Canadian Council of Chief Executives, New Frontiers: Building a 21st Century Canada-United States
Partnershi in North America, (Apr 2004), available online at <http://www.ceocouncil.ca/
pubhlications/pdf/8502al 3cf417dO9eabl3468e2a7c9f65/NewFrontiersNASPIDiscussionPap
er_April_2004.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007). See also Evidence of Anthony Burger (Chief Economist,
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), Standing Committee on International Trade, 39th Can ParI,
1st Sess 1110 (Apr 24, 2007), available online at <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/
CommitteePublication.aspx?SourceId=202771 > (visited Nov 17, 2007).
73 Prosperity Agenda (cited in note 66).
74 For a general discussion, see Survy: Living with Number One, Economist 10 (Dec 3, 2005).
75 The Canada-United States Smart Border Declaration, (Dec 2001), available online at
<http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/anti-terrorism/actionplan-en.asp> (visited Nov 17, 2007); United
States-Mexico Border Partnership Agreement, (Mar 21, 2002), available online at
<http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/8909.htm> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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bio-protection, aviation and maritime security, and intelligence cooperation, as
well as measures to facilitate the efficient movement of goods and people across
North American borders, make up the "Security Agenda."76
The SPP process also coincided with the development of two private-
sector-initiated reports that outlined ambitious regional integration
recommendations. The first initiative was launched by the Canadian Council of
Chief Executives ("CCCE"), a business-oriented public policy and advocacy
organization. In 2004, the CCCE issued a report under the "North American
Security and Prosperity Initiative" calling for a reinvigorated regional integration
strategy between Canada and the United States.77 The second report was
cosponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations, the CCCE, and the Consejo
Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales, and also proposed far-reaching
integration measures in a report prepared by an independent task force in 2005.8
In both cases, the areas of concern identified in their respective
recommendations found expression within the SPP process, including the name
"Security and Prosperity" itself (derived from the CCCE Initiative) and the
suggestion for a North American Advisory Council (of private sector leaders),
which became the NACC. The NACC consists of many of the same persons
involved in the drafting of these two reports.79 It provides advice and
recommendations directly to the ministers responsible for the SPP. This was
done for the first time in a February 2007 report outlining both short-term and
medium-term goals for the SPP process.80 There is no comparable avenue for
the direct voicing of comments by other civil society groups, which again
suggests that the SPP is understood to be a narrow exercise without broad policy
ramifications for the public at large.
Integral to the SPP as a whole is the conscious linking of security with
prosperity,8' but beyond this overarching goal the SPP does not articulate any
coherent vision of a future North America, nor does the SPP seek to root its
76 See SecuriyAgenda (cited in note 66).
77 Canadian Council of Chief Executives, New Frontiers at 4-5 (cited in note 72).
78 Council on Foreign Relations, Building a North American Communiy (cited in note 70).
79 For a list of members of the NACC, see North American Competiveness Council, Enhancing
Competiveness in Canada, Mexico and the United States: Private Sector Prioities for the Security and Pros erity
Partnership of North America (SPP), 58 (Feb 2007), available online at <http://www.ceocouncil.ca/
publications/pdf/test_4d5f2a8ae89332894118d2f53176d82b/NACCReport toMinisters_
February_23_2007.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
80 See id.
81 See Joint Statement (Mar 23, 2005) (cited in note 65) (indicating "[this work will be based on the
principle that our security and prosperity are mutually dependent and complementary, and will
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work program in a normative framework. Rather the approach is technocratic
and problem oriented. The SPP agendas identify a large number of small
problems and indicate types of cooperative outcomes that would solve the
problem.82 Given this approach, the agendas themselves are a disparate
collection of policy initiatives. Perhaps given this lack of focus, at the 2006
Summit, the leaders identified five priority areas for special attention: (1) the
creation of the NACC; (2) cooperation on avian and pandemic influenza; (3)
North American energy security; (4) North American emergency management;
and (5) smart and secure borders.83
In keeping with other forms of transgovernmental networks, the SPP has
no formal institutional structure, nor has the SPP resulted in the creation of any
institutions beyond the NACC. The structure at present is that each of the
various working groups, which correspond to the classification of initiatives in
the SPP agendas, report back to lead ministers, who in turn report to the leaders.
There is no formal or informal role for the legislative branches. Indeed, in a
well-publicized statement, one member of the NACC noted, "[w]e've decided
not to recommend any things that would require legislative changes...
[b]ecause we won't get anywhere."84 Each state is responsible for appointing
persons to the working groups, although in a number of cases it appears that
pre-existing networks were brought into the SPP process. For example, the
North American Energy Working Group, which was established in 2001,
became the network for the energy initiatives under the SPP.85 Similarly, the
North American Steel Trade Committee, established in 2002 to pursue a North
82 The June 2005 Report to Leaders contains a Security Annex and Prosperity Annex, which set out in
greater detail the proposed action to be taken and timeframe for completion for each initiative
identified in the Securioy Agenda and Properiy Agenda. See Security and Prosperity Partnership of
North America, June 2005 Report to Leaders, (June 2005), available online at
<http://www.spp.gov/report tojeaders/index.asp?dName=reporttojeaders> (visited Nov
17, 2007).
83 See Joint Statement (Mar 23, 2005) (cited in note 65).
84 Luiza Savage, Meet NAFTA 2.0, Maclean's 28, 28 (Sept 11, 2006) (quoting Ron Corvais). This
statement appears to be confirmed by Michael Hart (a former Canadian trade negotiator and a
member of the Independent Task Force on the Future of North America) who notes:
The biggest problem that I see with [the SPP] is that it is an initiative that is
limited to what can be done by the three governments within their existing
legislative mandates. There's a commitment that they will not do things that
will require them to go to Parliament or to Congress in order to make changes.
Evidence of Micbael Hart, Standing Committee on International Trade, 39th Can Pan, 1st Sess
1140 (May 3, 2007), available online at <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/Committee
Publication.aspx?Sourceld=206477> (visited Nov 17, 2007) ("Evidence of MicbaelHar').
85 North American Energy Working Group, Overview, available online at
<http://www.pi.energy.gov/documents/NAEWGBkg02O3O6.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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American Steel Strategy, began to report through the Manufactured Goods and
Sectoral and Regional Competiveness Working Group.86
Given the wide-ranging nature of the agenda items within the working
groups, there appears to be a further division of labor within working groups
resulting in the creation of more focused subgroups. There are no formal
requirements for working groups to consult with stakeholders, although they are
clearly free to do so.8" The difficulty is that beyond the base documents, there
has been little attempt made at general dissemination of information regarding
working group activities. There are, for example, no readily available lists of
which officials are part of which working groups, when meetings are held, what
matters are discussed, and who is consulted.
Unlike most transgovernmental networks where the network itself is
responsible for setting its own agenda, the SPP process is highly centralized. The
executive branches of each government were jointly responsible for creating the
Prosperity and Security Agendas, which not only identified the network's
outcomes, but also identified timeframes.88 The criteria by which agenda items
were determined for inclusion is not disclosed, although by taking advantage of
the work of existing networks, it is evident that the framers of the SPP sought to
bring into that process a number of ongoing initiatives.89 In addition, many of
the initiatives appear to be derived from the issues identified by the private
sector.90 The result is an eclectic mixture of initiatives that lacks any real
coherence.9
Consider, for example, the initiatives included in the environment and
energy portions of the Prosperity Agenda.92 The environmental agenda is at once
both far-reaching and narrow. The matters addressed include clean air and
86 Discussed in Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, June 2005 Report to Leaders
(cited in note 82).
87 There is a general SPP Comment Form by which members of the public can forward comments
to particular working groups. See Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, SPP
Comment Form, available online at <http://hq-intranet04.usfcs.doc.gov/bid/spp/comment.asp>
(visited Nov 17, 2007).
88 The timeframes are identified in the Security and Prosperity Annexes to the June 2005 Report to
Leaders. See Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America, June 2005 Report to Leaders
(cited in note 82).
89 See Evidence of Michael Hart at 1140 (cited in note 84).
90 For example, many of the issues identified by the CCCE and subsequently by the Independent
Task Force on the Future of North America have been incorporated into the SPP.
91 See Roland Paris, A TrilateralMishmash, Globe and Mail at A17 (cited in note 4).
92 The specific deliverables are set out in Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America,
2006 Report to Leaders, Prosperity Annex 25-30 (Aug 2006), available online at
<http://www.spp.gov/2006_report-to-leaders/prosperity--annex.pdf?.dName=2006_reportto
leaders > (visited Nov 17, 2007) ("2006 Report to Leaders').
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water, biological diversity, marine resources, and transboundary environmental
impacts. However, none of these issue areas is tackled in a manner that
approaches comprehensiveness. Instead, the Agenda tends to identify quite
specific deliverables, such as increasing supply of low sulfur fuel to Mexico,
addressing ship-source air pollution, developing options to advance ocean
observation in the Arctic as input to International Polar Year, or concluding a
transboundary environmental impact assessment agreement.93 In most of these
cases, the specific initiative identified preceded its identification in the SPP. For
example, the conclusion of a transboundary environmental impact assessment
agreement has been part of the NACEC's work plan for over ten years, being
identified in the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
itself.94 Another deliverable, signing the Declaration of Intent for the
Conservation of North American Birds and their Habitat, was the work of an
existing Tri-National Committee of the North American Bird Conservation
Initiative created under the auspices of the NACEC.9" The energy agenda
similarly relies on the presence of pre-existing network structures and their work
programs, such as the North American Energy Working Group, and the
established experts groups within it, as well as the North American Electric
Reliability Council.96 The Environment and Energy Working Groups appear to
operate largely as conduits, directing specific initiatives to smaller working
groups and existing networks, and then reporting back on progress and
outcomes to the lead ministers and leaders.
The transfer of existing networks and their work programs raises the
question of why these existing networks needed to be brought into the SPP
process at all. What the SPP offers that the existing frameworks do not is the
ability of the central governments to exert greater control over the priorities and
work plans of the networks. To the extent that the SPP process is permeable to
democratic influences, the greater control exercised by visible politicians should
be seen as improving the democratic responsiveness and efficacy of the
93 Id at 29-30.
94 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperalion, art X(7) (cited in note 35). For a discussion
of this process, see Neil Craik, Transboundagy Environmental Impact Assessment in North America:
Obstacles and Opportunities, in Kees Bastmeijer and Timo Koivurova, eds, The Theogy and Practice of
Transboundagy Environmental Impact Assessment ch 5 (Hotei 2007).
95 See North American Bird Conservation Initiative, Dedaration of Intent for the Conservation of North
American Birds and their Habitat: Questions and Answers, (May 25, 2005), available online at
<http://www.nabci-us.org/aboutnabci/Q&A-NABCI-DOI.pdf > (visited Nov 17,2007).
96 To be clear, not all of the agenda items were derived from existing initiatives. One of the energy
initiatives was to increase oil sands production to increase continental energy supplies, which
resulted in the creation of an ad hoc oil sands expert group. See 2006 Report to Leaders, Prosperity
Annex at 26 (cited in note 92).
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networks. By identifying agenda items and timeframes for their completion, the
central governments enable networks by directing departmental resources to
given issues and signaling the political importance of the initiative to bureaucrats
as a means to surmount bureaucratic inertia. The corollary is that those issues
not identified may suffer from neglect. In this regard, it is noteworthy that many
of the most pressing environmental issues, such as climate change, are not
addressed in the SPP.97 A further implication of the central governments'
agenda-setting power is that outcomes are likely to be affected by the working
group to which an issue is assigned. For example, the pesticide, new chemical,
and biotechnology initiatives are all under working groups other than the
Environmental Working Group. 9 The point is not that there is a correct
network for addressing these issues, but rather that because of the cross-cutting
nature of these issues, care needs to be taken to ensure that the network
members have sufficient access to relevant government expertise and policy
input. Given that the selective membership of networks may impact the
information made available (or deemed relevant) to network members, there is a
concern that governments can affect outcomes by excluding certain viewpoints,
within and outside the government, from the deliberation process. While this
might be done consciously, it is, in our view, more likely to be an unintended
consequence of the centralized determination of network agendas.
Central governments have sought to distance the SPP process from the
idea that the SPP is directed towards the creation of a supranational
government.99 Despite this disavowal, the SPP is clearly oriented towards
integration. In this regard, the SPP is best seen as a compromise between two
alternative approaches to continental governance in North America: the "big
idea" and incrementalism. 1°' Incrementalism seeks to address issues requiring
cooperation on a case-by-case basis, while the "big idea" seeks to address
integration on a comprehensive level, akin to the European Union, through the
creation of common institutions and a broad, unifying vision of a North
97 Outside the environmental area, critical trade issues such as softwood lumber and trade dispute
resolution have also been left out of the SPP. See Paris, A TrilateralMishmash, Globe and Mail at
A17 (cited in note 4).
98 New chemicals fall under the Manufactured Goods Working Group, while pesticides and
biotechnology come under the Food and Agriculture Working Group. See 2006 Report to Leaders,
Prosperity Annex at 9 (chemicals), 35 (pesticides) (cited in note 92).
99 See SPP Myths vs Facts (cited in note 15).
100 Canadian Council of Chief Executives, New Froniers at 4 (cited in note 72). For background on
this debate, see Peter Hakim and Robert Litan, eds, The Future of North American Integration: Beyond
NiAFTA (Brookings Institution 2002); Robert Pastor, Toward a North American Community: Lessons
firm the Old Worldfor the New (Inst Intl Econ 2001).
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American community.)" The SPP seeks to capture some of the advantages of
comprehensive integration without getting mired down in a more abstract
debate about sovereignty and attracting the political frictions that would
accompany a more formal approach. In the words of the Economist. "From the
integrators' perspective, one advantage of the SPP is the absence of any 'big
bang': the officials can operate below the political radar, without involving the
American or Mexican Congress or Canada's Parliament."'' 2 In particular, what
the SPP offers that pure incrementalism does not is an opportunity to link
issues, to allow for trade-offs across issues, and to provide for a more
comprehensive approach to regional integration. °3 In addition, packaging the
initiatives together provides greater political momentum to move forward on
issues.'0 4 Seen in this light, the SPP marries the US desire for enhanced North
American security, including energy supply security, with the Canadian and
Mexican desire for uninterrupted access to the US marketplace. The SPP's
centralized form of transgovernmentalism facilitates this middle ground by
allowing government officials to work toward greater integration on identified
issues within their area of expertise, while the central governments can oversee
the agenda and ensure that any trade-offs are acceptable.
IV. SUPERHIGHWAYS AND HIDDEN AGENDAS: THE
SPP's CRITICS
One might expect the presence of greater central government control to
mitigate concerns over the accountability of transgovernmental networks. This
concern arises because of the perception that individual agencies are engaging in
decisionmaking processes outside the usual domestic legal framework. The SPP
appears to address this concern by having the agenda more closely controlled by
the political executives of each of the partner countries. However, as noted in
the Introduction, the SPP has been subject to a barrage of criticism from both
sides of the political spectrum. In essence, the debate over the SPP is centered
on whether it is, as its proponents maintain, an incremental and technical
101 Perhaps the most prominent advocate of the "big idea" is Robert Pastor. See Pastor, Toward a
North American Communiy (cited in note 100).
102 Living with Number One, Economist at 10 (cited in note 74).
103 Canadian Council of Chief Executives, New Frontiers at 4 (cited in note 72).
104 Evidence of Michael Hart at 1140 (cited in note 84):
What the SPP did.. .is take many of these ongoing initiatives and package
them together to provide a little bit more political jazz to them, and what's
useful to officials, in order to provide them with some political leadership. To
an official working on a problem, the kind of speed and intensity with which
you address those issues is dependent on the amount of political leadership
you see, the amount of political commitment you see to a problem.
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exercise,10 5 or whether it has grander ambitions to implement "deep integration"
and eventually establish North American supranational institutions.10 6 The result
is a sort of nondebate, with opponents pointing to hidden agendas and grand
schemes and the governments maintaining that the SPP simply provides a forum
for bureaucrats to resolve technical issues. So, for example, in Canada, the
debate on the environmental and resource aspects of the SPP has been
dominated by claims that the SPP will lead to a loss of control over natural
resources, bulk water exports from Canada to the United States, and the
adoption of lower environmental standards.'0 7 In the United States, the debate
has focused on immigration and, puzzlingly, on the potential for the building of
a "NAFTA superhighway."'0 8
There is nothing within the SPP process that lends credence to these
criticisms. Indeed, the governments have explicitly denied that bulk water
105 See Evidence of Alain Beaudoin (Executive Director, Innovation Partnership Branch, Department of Industy,
Canada), Standing Committee on International Trade, 39th Can Parl, 1st Sess 1105 (May 10,
2007), available online at <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/comrnittee/391/ciit/evidence/
ev2934562/ciitev62-e.htm#Int-2072697> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (describing the SPP "as a step-
by-step, practical approach to improve the way governments work together to enhance
competitiveness').
106 "Deep integration" is described by one critic in the following terms: "the idea is that the more
governments harmonize regulations across borders, the 'deeper' economic integration has been
achieved. It is not just about policy harmonization in North America. It is policy harmonization
that increasingly opens social life across the continent to the discipline of the market." Teresa
Healey, Deep Integration in North America: Securiy and Prosperiy for Whom?, Canadian Labour
Congress Research Paper 42 (Feb 2007), available online at <http://canadianlabour.ca/
index.php/DeepIntegration/1134> (visited Nov 17, 2007). See also Andro Linklater, The Center
Shouldn't Hold, NY Times Al 7 (July 4, 2007) (noting "[alnti-immigration drum-beaters like CNN's
Lou Dobbs and Representative Virgil Goode, a Virginia Republican, routinely portray the [SPP]
as a threat to United States sovereignty"). Conservative activist Jerome Corsi has written a book
condemning the SPP as part of an elaborate long-term strategy by multinational corporations to
create a single continental market. See Luiza Savage, Even the Best Neighbours Can Get Supicious,
Maclean's 44 (Aug 13, 2007).
107 Andrew Nikiforuk, Adele Hurley, and Ralph Pentland, Sold Down the River; Despite Claims to the
Conragy, Water is on the Table in Trade Negotiations - We Need to be Clear With Our Neighbours That We
Intend to Keep This Precious Resource, Ottawa Citizen All (Sept 10, 2007) ("The fate of our water
resources is now dependent on shadowy discussions taking place under the aegis of the Security
and Prosperity Partnership (SPP), the all-purpose negotiating forum set up by the three NAFTA
leaders in 2005."). On control over energy resources, see Gordon Laxer, Easterners Could Freere in
the Dark, Globe and Mail Al5 (May 28, 2007).
108 For a representative rendition of this argument, see Ron Paul, The NAFTA Superhighway, available
online at <http://www.house.gov/paul/tst/tst2006/tstlO3OO6.htm> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
This superhighway would connect Mexico, the United States, and Canada,
cutting a wide swath through the middle of Texas and up through Kansas City.
Offshoots would connect the main artery to the west coast, Florida, and
northeast. Proponents envision a ten-lane colossus the width of several
football fields, with freight and rail lines, fiber-optic cable lines, and oil and
natural gas pipelines running alongside.
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exports and the construction of a superhighway form any part of the SPP
agenda. Nevertheless, these issues persist and have even been taken up by the
legislative branches of the governments." 9 It is equally salient that very little of
the criticism of the SPP's environmental agenda has focused on the actual
initiatives undertaken within the SPP process, which appear constructive and
oriented towards improved environmental performance."0 The focus is not on
what the SPP actually is; rather, the criticism centers on the potential of the SPP
to derogate from the authority of national governments to set domestic policy-
be it on energy, the environment, or immigration-independently from the
market, and from their trading partners.
The mistrust inherent in this form of critique is exacerbated by concerns
regarding the democratic legitimacy of the SPP process."' These concerns relate
to three aspects of the SPP process. Firstly, there is a sense that the central
governments have quite deliberately turned away from the legislative process.112
Secondly, the process has not offered meaningful opportunities for public
consultation. Public consultation is the responsibility of individual working
groups, but there is little evidence to date that working groups have opened up
their processes to the broader public. And finally, while civil society has been
shut out of the process, members of the business elite, as represented by the
North American Competitiveness Council, have been granted direct access to
the leaders and appear to have had many of their concerns taken up. The NACC
has been a lightning rod for critics. At the Montebello Summit, civil society
critics were quick to point out that while they were cordoned off, well away from
the leaders' meeting, the members of the NACC met directly with the leaders."
3
109 The Canadian House of Commons has debated the bulk water export issue in relation to the SPP,
161 House of Commons Debates (Hansard) 9958 (May 31, 2007) (statement of Mr. Serge Cardin),
available online at <http://www2.parl.gc.ca/HousePubications/Pubication.aspx?Language=
E&Mode=1&Parl=39&Ses=1&Docld-2989762#1nt-2114181> (visited Nov 17, 2007). In the
United States, a transportation bill was amended to include a provision blocking federal funding
for a superhighway and for Department of Transportation participation in SPP working groups.
See Savage, Even the Best, Maclean's at 45 (cited in note 106).
110 The concerns regarding the Security Agenda initiatives are more directed at the actual outcomes.
See, for example, Emily Gilbert, Leaky Border and Solid Cilizens: Governing Security, Prosperiy and
Qualiy of Lffe in a North American Partnershp, 39 Antipode 77 (2007).
Ill In this regard the debate over the SPP tracks similar debates regarding the democratic legitimacy
of transgovernmental networks generally. See Slaughter, A New World Order at 217-30 (cited in
note 5).
112 See Evidence of Maude Barlow (National Chairperson, Council of Canadians), Standing Committee on
International Trade, 39th Can ParI, 1st Sess 1125 (May 1, 2007), available online at
<http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/CommitteePublication.aspx?Sourceld=206020> (visited Nov 17,
2007).
113 Norma Greenaway and Richard Foot, Haper Broaches Arctic; PM Opens Summit with Bush, Calderon,
National Post Al (August 21, 2007).
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There is a clear link between the concerns over process legitimacy and the
nature of substantive complaints raised by critics. The critics have seized on
documents and statements made by integration proponents outside the
government and have incorrectly attributed those views to the government. For
example, the connection between bulk water export and the SPP has largely
arisen because of the inclusion of a recommendation by the Independent Task
Force on the Future of North America that those sectors excluded from
NAFTA (such as bulk water export) be the subject of further review, and
because the issue was raised at a meeting organized by a Washington, DC think
tank on North American integration. 14 In neither case did the suggestions
regarding bulk water exports come from government officials. There has been
no indication from governmental officials that bulk water exports are to become
part of the SPP process.
Similarly, the superhighway issue has been given an air of reality because of
the existence of a nongovernmental group (again unconnected to the SPP)
promoting better North-South transportation corridors. The closed nature of
the SPP process and its close affiliation with the private sector invites this kind
of attribution because the line between the public process and private demands
has been blurred.'15 In some cases, placing an issue within the SPP process has
reduced the avenues of public participation. When the negotiation of the
transboundary environmental impact assessment agreement was the
responsibility of the NACEC, that process provided for citizen oversight
through the Joint Public Advisory Committee and the NACEC's own
procedures for openness. " 6 Moving the issue into the SPP process has
foreclosed this option, leaving the current status of negotiations and the process
for public consultation uncertain."7
Not all of the concerns raised by the critics of the SPP fall outside the
identified initiatives. The areas of pesticide and chemical regulation, both of
114 Maude Barlow, Where's the Tranmpareng, Globe and Mail (cited in note 1).
n5 See, for example, Paris, A Trilateral Mishmash, Globe and Mail at A17 (cited in note 4).
Notwithstanding the government's view that these criticisms are coming from outside the
mainstream, they have felt compelled to respond. The US government has set up a SPP Myths vs
Facts webpage (cited in note 15).
116 The role of the Joint Public Advisory Committee within the CEC is described in John Wirth,
Perspectives on the Joint Public Advisog Committee, in Markell and Knox, eds, Greening NAFTA 199
(cited in note 36).
117 These concerns are set out in Pelition Filed by Sierra Legal Defence Fund under Section 22 of the Auditor
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which are addressed in the Prosperity Agenda," 8 have attracted concerns
regarding the potential for harmonization and shifts in regulatory approaches." 9
Here as well, there appears to be little agreement on the basic orientation of the
initiatives, with the critics characterizing the approach as leading inexorably to a
harmonized regulatory regime 12  while government officials deny those
objectives, preferring to differentiate between harmonization and regulatory
cooperation. 121 Instead of the debate addressing the extent and merits of
regulatory cooperation, it focuses on the intent of the governments to achieve an
end they specifically deny.
The government response to the criticism has been to emphasize the SPP's
nonbinding and technical nature. A Canadian trade official described the SPP in
these terms:
There is a misunderstanding among many that the governments have a
legally binding agreement, or an agreement of any kind, that defines the
partnership. In fact, it is a process by which governments seek to cooperate
more fully on a range of issues.
With respect to each government, we have our own processes to engage the
public and the stakeholders if we're talking about a change of policy, law, or
regulation. Through the partnership, we are attempting to identify areas
where individually we might choose to make changes that would work if
they were done together. But they are subject to the usual oversight that all
of our changes would have.' 22
118 2006 Report to Leaders, Prosperity Annex at 9 (chemicals), 35 (pesticides) (cited in note 92).
Chemical regulation is also the subject of a separate agreement that arose out of the Montebello
Summit. See Canada/United States/Mexico SPP Regulatory Cooperation Framework, Regulatoy
Cooperation in the Area of Chemicals, available online at <http://www.spp.gov/pdf/
spp.reg-coop-chemicals.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
119 See Evidence of Peter Julian, Standing Committee on International Trade, 39th Can Pan, 1st Sess
1140 (May 10, 2007) (raising concerns with harmonization of pesticide standards), available online
at <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/CommitteePublication.aspx?Sourceld=208182&Lang=l&
PARLSES=391&JNT=0&COM=0> (visited Nov 17, 2007) ("Evidence of Peter Julian"). See also
Bruce Campbell, More Than Jelybeans: The SPP Regulatory Framework Agreement and its Impact on
Chemicals Regulation, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives (Sept 2007), available online at
<http://www.poicyalternatives.ca/documents/National-Office-Pubs/2007/More-ThanJellyb
eans.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (discussing concerns that regulatory cooperation could lead to
increased deregulation).
120 Campbell, More ThanJelybeans at 7 ("The cumulative effect, however, is hugely significant as we
move closer to the endpoint: a single continental regulatory regime whose shape is determined
informally by the large partner.") (cited in note 119).
121 CanWest News Service, Ottawa Not Harmoni/ng Chemical Rules, Financial Post FP6 (Sept 28, 2007)
(quoting spokesperson for Canadian Health Minister, "We are not harmonizing. We are co-
operating... Harmonizing is a completely different concept.'.
122 Evidence of William Crosbie (Director General, North America Bureau, Department of Foreign Affairs and
International Trade), Standing Committee on International Trade, 39th Can Parl, 1st Sess 1105 (Apr
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The supporters of the process tend to view it as 300 distinct technical
initiatives, as opposed to a unified process of integration.1 23 Seen this way, there
is no hidden agenda; rather the SPP is what it appears to be. Moreover, the
centralizing function of the government manifested in packaging these initiatives
has the effect of shedding more, not less, light on the process. Given that much
of the network activity was ongoing prior to the SPP, but with little attention
given to it, it is evident that the SPP, and particularly the Leaders' Summits, have
generated a greater awareness of the ongoing process of regional integration.
However, it also remains true that the debate is largely dominated by "experts
and enthusiasts," as opposed to the broader citizenry.
124
By characterizing the process as being largely technical, the central
governments gloss over the essential governmental nature of the SPP. As
discussed above, much of what the SPP contemplates undertaking goes beyond
exchanging information. Many of the initiatives contemplate harmonization of
standards, equivalency, and mutual recognition agreements. The response to
concerns about possible lower standards resulting from harmonization has been
to provide assurances that high standards will be maintained and that regulatory
changes will be subject to the usual domestic processes. 2 ' The difficulty is that
the SPP process provides no clear direction on the issue of standards in terms of
both substance and procedure.'26 Concerns about the nature of convergence are
not without foundation. Raustiala's study indicates that regulatory convergence
will often result in the adoption of the standards of more powerful states, 2 7
24, 2007), available online at <http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/Content/HOC/commirrttee/391/ciit/
evidence/ev2861332/ciitev57-e.htrm#Int-2025319> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
123 Evidence of David Stewart-Patterson (Executive Vice-President, CCCE), Standing Committee on
International Trade, 39th Can Parl, 1st Sess 1120 (Apr 26, 2007), available online at
<http://cmte.parl.gc.ca/cmte/CommitteePublication.aspx?SourceId=204967> (visited Nov 17,
2007) ("[t]he initial SPP agenda included some 300 items. Many of these represent very small
steps and individually won't make much of a difference. On the other hand, even 300 small steps,
if we take them all, add up to a pretty giant leap for North America and without any need for a
grand bargain.").
124 Slaughter, A New World Order at 9-10 (cited in note 5) (quoting Martin Shapiro, Administrative Law
Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance, 8 IndJ Global Legal Studies 369, 376 (2001)).
125 See, for example, the SPP Myths vs Facts webpage (cited in note 15), addressing this issue.
126 For example, the SPP refers to "regulatory cooperation," which reveals little about the extent and
nature of coordinated regulatory activity. See, for example, Security and Prosperity Partnership of
North America, Canada/ US/Mexico SPP Regulatogy Cooperation Framework, available online at
<http://www.spp.gov/pdf/spp-reg-coop-final.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007) ("Regulatogy
Cooperation Framework").
127 Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl L at 58-61 (cited in note 5).
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which in the context of North America would suggest that US standards are
more likely to be adopted, even if they are lower.128
Whether harmonization up or down makes sense will, of course, depend
on a host of factors, many of which will be technical. But such a decision will
also require consideration of the distributive consequences and value-based
concerns that inhere in decisions regarding environmental standards, and as such
needs to be subject to public deliberation. The direction of the SPP, and of the
recently adopted SPP Regulatory Cooperation Framework,129 is to favor
international and "domestic voluntary consensus standards," placing a further
burden of justification on those who wish to deviate from those standards. This
direction represents a form of indirect delegation to those standard creation
bodies, with little direct input available to those affected by their decisions.
Providing that regulatory changes conform to domestic administrative
requirements is a formal response to a process that is understood to operate
more on the basis of soft power than binding obligations. 3 ° Here too the
approach seems to ignore the informal and international nature of
transgovernmentalism. The practical concern is that domestic administrative
safeguards alone will not effectively provide for accountability when the
decisionmaking process exists outside the domestic political system, even where
the network members exercise their authority formally within the domestic
system. If, however, one recognizes that the transgovernmental networks
themselves are exercising authority, albeit soft power, then the locus of authority
shifts from the purely domestic to the transnational.
One possible solution is to extend the procedural requirements to the
network itself.' Determining what those procedural safeguards might be is
highly complicated in light of the informality of networks and the fact that
network efficacy depends to a significant degree on the shared values of the
network members, as opposed to the formal exercise of authority. In Slaughter's
words:
128 Canadian critics have pointed to the adoption of lower US pesticide residue standards, as an
example of this tendency. See Evidence of Peter Julian at 1140 (cited in note 119); Loti Wallach,
Accountable Governance in an Era of Globa/i ation: The WTO, NAFTA and the International
Haronization of Standards, 50 Kan L Rev 823, 831 (2001-02).
129 Regulatory Cooperation Framework (cited in note 126).
130 This approach is affirmed in the SPP Myths vs Facts website (cited in note 15): "If an agency were
to decide a regulatory change is desirable through the cooperative efforts of SPP, that agency is
required to conform to all existing U.S. laws and administrative procedures, including an
opportunity to comment."
131 For one proposal based on US administrative norms, see Richard Stewart, U.S. Administrative Law:
A Model for Global Administrative Law, Institute for International Law and Justice Global
Administrative Law Series-Working Paper No 2005/7 (May 2005), available online at
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=723147> (visited Nov 17, 2007).
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As any feminist who has battled 'the old boy network' will quickly
recognize, the informality, flexibility, and decentralization of networks
means that it is very difficult to establish precisely who is acting and when.
Influence is subtle and hard to track; important decisions may be made in
very informal settings. As Martti Koskenniemi argues ... giving up form
and validity is ceding fundamental constraints on power. 132
However, it is plain that providing privileged network access to regulated
entities while at the same time excluding regulatory beneficiaries is not a
sustainable position. In a governance structure where the ability to exercise
influence is closely linked to the provision of information, being able to frame
problems and to present preferred regulatory solutions is a significant advantage
that should not be preferentially conferred.
The idea that the SPP is simply the sum total of its parts and nothing more
also invites further scrutiny. At the heart of the critiques of the SPP is the
opposing notion that the SPP is much more than what is presented. It is in this
regard, we have suggested, that the critics of the SPP are less concerned with
what the SPP is and more concerned with what it might be. If one considers the
evolutionary nature of transgovernmental networks, then the structure of the
SPP should be understood as dynamic and oriented towards convergence. This
is quite different from a hidden agenda, which seems to imply a duplicity for
which there is no evidence. Rather, the concern might be better phrased as
relating to the lack of clear boundaries within the process.
The absence of boundaries is particularly acute with the SPP because of the
breadth of the overall scheme. Network governance is more likely to be found
acceptable where the agencies involved already enjoy considerable independence
domestically. Thus, in the case of financial regulators such as central banks and
securities regulators, insularity from political interference adds to their
legitimacy. As a result, the exercise of that independence collectively in support
of shared goals should be less controversial because their independence is
broadly accepted and they are understood to exercise that independence only
within the confines of their mandate. The SPP, by comparison, involves
departments that operate under tighter political controls and provides no clear
boundaries on what activities are subject to network decisionmaking. If the
evolutionary nature of networks is to be taken seriously, then it follows that
there needs to be clearly understood limits to the extent and scope of network
activity.
132 Slaughter, Governing through Government Networks at 193-94 (cited in note 9).
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V. NETWORK LEGITIMACY AND THE SPP
Ultimately, the stability of transgovernmentalism as an approach to
governance depends on the legitimacy of the network. In this regard, the SPP's
framers rely on a thin version of legitimacy based on the technical expertise of
expert members and a highly formalistic version of procedural legitimacy.
However, as the debate over the SPP suggests, this version of legitimacy is
insufficient in light of the nature of transgovernmental networks. Expert
legitimacy, which justifies authority based on the qualifications of the
decisionmakers, assumes a rationalistic decisionmaking environment where right
answers can be determined. This environment in turn assumes broad-based
agreement on the regulatory ends sought.'33
If one accepts the SPP as simply an aggregation of technical problems,
then the delegation of authority to networks is largely unproblematic. Indeed,
the SPP succeeded in generating cooperative solutions to important issues such
as emergency planning, adequate responses to pandemics, and energy
performance standards. 34 These are not trifling accomplishments, and they
certainly point to the value of networks in resolving technical issues. However,
many of the issues, including those relating to access to energy supply and the
nature and extent of environmental regulation, cannot be rooted solely in expert
legitimacy since these issues require a careful balancing of competing values and
objectives. Indeed, even the determination of whether an issue is technical is
likely to be controversial and must itself be made with reference to substantive
criteria."3'
In this regard, it is helpful to compare other approaches to transnational
environmental governance with the SPP process. As noted, there are numerous
existing transgovernmental networks in the environment field.'36 In addition,
multilateral environmental agreements frequently resort to forms of delegated
133 See Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimafy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for International
Environmental Law, 93 Am J Ind L 596, 619-23 (1999) (discussing the limitations of expertise and
science as a basis for legitimacy in international environmental governance). See also Stephen
Bernstein, Legitimagy in Global Environmental Governance, 1 J Ind L & Ind Rel 139 (2005); Neil Craik,
Deberation and Legitimay in Transnational Environmental Governance: The Case of Environmental Impact
Assessment, 38 Victoria U Wellington L Rev 381 (2007).
134 Joint Statement of Prime Minister Haer, President Bush and President Caldern, North American Leaders'
Summit (Aug 21, 2007), available online at <http://www.spp.gov/pdf/leaders-statement_
2007_english.pdf> (visited Nov 17, 2007) (outlining the accomplishments of the SPP since the
previous leaders summit).
135 See, for example, Jacqueline Peel, International Law and the Legitimate Determination of Risk: Is
Democratising Expertise the Answer?, 38 Victoria U Wellington L Rev 363, 365-66 (2007) (discussing
fluid boundaries between science and politics in environmental decisionmaking).
136 See discussion of NACEC, INECE, and Canada-US Air Quality Committee, in Section II above.
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decisionmaking through the use of subsidiary decisionmaking bodies, such as
Conferences of the Parties ("COP') and Meetings of the Parties ("MOP"),
which also provide a measure of autonomy to the participants.137 However,
unlike the SPP process, these institutions are bound by agreed-upon substantive
principles. For example, the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation, which created the NACEC, contains an unequivocal commitment
to maintain and to improve environmental quality.13 8 Similarly, the Air Quality
Agreement defines the role of the Air Quality Committee in light of an
overarching environmental objective.139 In relation to MOPs and COPs, these
subsidiary bodies play a crucial role in implementing and deepening the
commitments found in multilateral environmental agreements, but they do not
have unfettered freedom to determine future normative arrangements. Rather,
they must remain faithful to the underlying purposes of the regime. Thus, in the
same manner that domestic administrative agencies are required to exercise their
authority within the limits of the delegation granted to them, international
instruments provide constraints on the exercise of discretion by transnational
decisionmakers.
As with many domestic delegations of authority, these substantive
constraints are limited because they are framed as principles in broad, open-
ended prescriptions. Consequently, these exercises of authority must adhere to
procedural norms, such as transparency, inclusivity, and a commitment to
reasoned decisionmaking. The NACEC, for example, provides opportunities for
citizen engagement through its citizen submissions process and Joint Public
Advisory Committee. 40 Similarly, many subsidiary treaty bodies in multilateral
environmental agreements provide extensive participatory rights to
nongovernmental organizations. 4' Adherence to procedural norms has both
instrumental and noninstrumental ends. In relation to the former, inclusivity is
intended to improve and to broaden the information that is brought to bear on
decisions. For example, the decision to create the NACC has largely been
137 See Churchill and Ulfstein, 94 Am J Intl L at 626-28 (cited in note 38) (discussing growing
autonomy of subsidiary bodies in MEAs); Brunn~e, 15 Leiden J Intl L I (cited in note 39)
(providing a more specific discussion of the legitimacy concerns the autonomy of subsidiary
bodies gives rise to and how these concerns may be mediated through process-oriented
measures).
138 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, preamble, art I (cited in note 35).
139 See Canada-US Air Quality Agreement, preamble (cited in note 30).
140 See David Markell, The CEC Citizen Submission Process: On or Off Course, in Knox and Markell, eds,
Greening NAFFA 274 (cited in note 36); John Wirth, Perspectives on the Joint Public Advisory Committee
at 199 (cited in note 36).
141 See Jonas Ebbeson, Public Paricipation, in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnde, and Ellen Hey, eds, The
Oxford Handbook of InternationalEnironmental Law 681, 689-92 (Oxford 2007).
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justified on the grounds that business leaders are in the best position to advise
bureaucrats on matters relating to North America's competitive position.'42 The
noninstrumental benefits of process are that decisions that account for the views
of those that are affected and which are justified in light of shared values are
more likely to be accepted, even by those whose interests are prejudiced by the
decision. Transparency can protect against rent-seeking minorities negatively
influencing outcomes.' Generating acceptance through the provision of
reasons is where procedural legitimacy interfaces with substantive legitimacy. In
order for reasons to be acceptable they must appeal to shared substantive
values.'"
In this vein, Slaughter argues that transgovernmentalism, if it is to become
a stable form of transnational governance, must be situated within a shared
normative framework:
What is still missing from this order, however, is norms. Power without
norms is both dangerous and useless. It is dangerous because of the risk of
abuse. It is useless because it lacks purpose. The answer in both cases is to
harness power and to constrain it through norms. 45
Our analysis of the SPP indicates that, unlike other environmental
networks, the process is not underlain by any expressed commitment to a shared
set of values, procedural or substantive. The difficulty that the SPP faces, in light
of its breadth, is finding a set of goals that are genuinely shared.
The approach in international environmental law has been to articulate a
common commitment to resolve an environmental issue in advance of
generating formally binding rules, usually in the form of a framework
convention. 146 The purpose of the framework convention is to provide a context
for the generation of more precise rules over time. 47 The efficacy of
142 See North American Competitiveness Council, Enhaning Competitiveness in Canada, Mexico and the
United States, 10 (Feb 2007), available online at <http://www.ceocouncil.ca/publications/pdf/
test_4d5f2a8ae89332894118d2f53176d82b/NACC_Report toMinistersFebruary_23_2007.pd>
(visited Nov 17, 2007).
143 For a discussion of small group influence on a state's external agenda, see Eyal Benvenisti, Sharing
Transbounday Resources: International Law and Oplimal Resource Use 53-58 (Cambridge 2002).
144 See Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democray? 25 (Princeton 2004)
(discussing the inadequacy of procedural norms alone to act as a basis for reciprocal justification
in deliberative processes).
145 Slaughter, A New World Order at 215 (cited in note 5).
146 See Giunther Handl, Environmental Security and Global Change: The Challenge to International Law, 1 YB
Intl Envir L 3, 5-7 (1990) (discussing use of framework conventions and subsequent negotiation
of more specific, rule-based protocols).
147 See Jutta Brunn~e and Stephen J. Toope, Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: Ecoystem
Regime Building, 91 Am J Intl L 26, 30-31 (1997). But see George Downs, Kyle Danish, and Peter
Barsoom, The Transformational Model of International Regime Design: Triumph of Hope or Experience?, 38
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transgovernmental networks also relies on the identification of common
problems and shared normative expectations by network participants. Where
networks are demand driven, in the sense that the need for cooperation is
identified and pursued by networks themselves, a shared substantive base is
generated through self-selection but can deepen through socialization and an
ongoing commitment to deliberation. It follows that Slaughter and other
network scholars have not identified substantive criteria for networks, as these
will depend on the networks themselves. In the case of nested environmental
networks, these values are derived from the commitments that inhere within the
regime itself.
The difficulties in a self-conscious attempt to use transgovernmental
networks to effect cooperation across issue areas is that there remains a need for
some clear basis upon which network outcomes can be assessed, but generating
agreement even at a fairly abstracted level is a politically costly activity. The
different forms of legitimacy that networks rely upon, namely expertise, process
values, and substantive values, do not operate independently of one another.
Instead, where there is an absence of one form of legitimacy, another form
compensates for that absence. In light of the lack of a shared substantive
commitment to integration and a common understanding of how the competing
objectives of the SPP will be traded off against one another, there is an
enhanced need for procedural norms to generate legitimacy. However, process is
itself not without its costs, and where the costs of inclusivity and transparency
outweigh the efficiency and flexibility benefits of networks, the stability of
networks as a governance tool is likely to be eroded. Our analysis of the SPP
provides support for the view put forward by Raustiala that transgovernmental
networks will interact with traditional, treaty based forms of international law
"synergistically and supportively." '148 These positive interactions may result in
functional benefits, but linkages between treaties and networks also provide
opportunities for networks to draw on the substantive legitimacy of treaty
commitments, facilitating deeper cooperation.
VI. CONCLUSION: THE LESSONS OF THE SPP
A study on the extent of transgovernmental networks between Canada and
the United States identified at least 240 networks, showing that, even before the
Colum J Transnatl L 465, 470-73 (2000) (criticizing approaches to regime design that rely on
cooperative evolution).
148 Raustiala, 43 Va J Intl L at 91-92 (cited in note 5) ("Most notably, by promoting capacity building
at the domestic level networks can enhance compliance with, and the effectiveness of, existing
treaties.'). See also Slaughter and Zaring, 2 Ann Rev of L & Soc Sci at 225 (cited in note 5).
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SPP, networked governance was pervasive in North America) 49 The SPP has
sought to capitalize on the presence of networks and further institutionalize their
use through the creation of more centrally controlled agenda-setting and
reporting processes for networks. Our review of the environmental aspects of
the SPP reveal an approach that is ad hoc in the sense that the network activities
sought to be conducted appear to be mostly an amalgam of existing initiatives,
lacking any overall coherence. The initiatives themselves have not attracted
much concern, and indeed, they appear to be oriented towards achieving
positive environmental change.
Despite the seemingly benign nature of the SPP's environmental agenda,
critics have raised concerns regarding the potential of the SPP to erode
environmental values and national sovereignty over resource and environmental
policy. The result is an unproductive debate that focuses more on future
intentions than present policy. While there is no apparent evidence of many of
the specific concerns raised, the nature of the debate itself is in part a product of
the structure of the SPP, which provides no underlying substantive vision and
affords few procedural protections to citizens potentially affected by policy
matters determined through the SPP process. Political oversight by the central
executive branches of each of the SPP partners has not resulted in widespread
acceptance of the SPP process.
The chief failing of the SPP is that its framers have not fully appreciated
the nature of transgovernmentalism. Treating networks simply as meeting places
for government officials, but not possessed of governmental characteristics,
underestimates, in our view, the power of networks to generate formal and
informal modes of governance. The result is to locate the locus of network
authority incorrectly within the state and to anchor network authority solely in
domestic legal authority. What is required in our view is a more robust
understanding of network legitimacy that draws on a genuinely shared
commitment to both procedural and substantive ends. At the center of the SPP
debate are deep cleavages regarding the value of integration and the ends which
cooperative behavior is meant to serve. The desire to avoid a politically costly
debate on regional integration is understandable. However, given the
evolutionary nature of networks and their inclination towards convergence, there
is a clear need for the delineation of boundaries of network activity and,
ultimately, linkage to the legislative branch of the government.
149 Evidence of Michael Hart at 1140 (cited in note 84).
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